Gunner Position - M4A3 (76)W Medium (Sherman) Tank 

Rank - P.F.C. / Serial # 36271631   

19 October 1944 - 2nd Tk Bn crosses into Luxembourg and moves toward Merch, Luxembourg. 9th Armored Division was placed under VIII CORPS RESERVE.

24 October 1944 - 2nd Tk Bn leaves Merch, Luxembourg and moves to Scheidgen, Luxembourg. 2nd Tk Bn is now at what is the "front line" in that area and begins engaging in indirect fire missions against the enemy in support of the U.S. 83rd Infantry Division.

10 November 1944 - 2nd Tk Bn is ordered to move to Berg, Luxembourg for what was thought to be the final location for the remainder of the winter.

15 December 1944 - 2nd Tank Battalion placed under control of COMBAT COMMAND RESERVE of the 9th Armored Division whereupon they move from Scheidgen, Luxembourg to Trois Vierges (54 miles apart), Luxembourg. On the night of the 15th they begin receiving incoming German artillery fire - their first significant enemy fire. Orders were then received that they would be in support of the 28th Infantry Division in the event that they were attacked.

***

08:00 17 December 1944 - 2nd Tank Battalion was no longer to fight as a unit - its companies were deployed to different locations. At 0800 “B” Company is ordered to proceed to Dummage, Luxembourg, and at 1000 is ordered to proceed to Clervaux and report to the C.O. of the 110th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division. “B” company’s 3 platoons split up into separate missions around Clervaux.

12:00 17 December 1944 - 2nd Tk Bn less Companies “B” and “Service” ordered to assemble and prepare a defensive position at Wilmerdange, Luxembourg.

17:00 17 December 1944 - Last message received from “B” Company of 2nd Tank Battalion. All “B” company tanks are lost in the determined American resistance around Clervaux.

17:25 17 December 1944 - Companies “A”, “C” and “D” of 2nd Tk Bn move to Oberwampach, Luxembourg - arriving at 0100 18 December 1944.

***

01:00 18 December 1944 - TASK FORCE ROSE - Company “A” of 2nd Tk Bn along with Company “C” of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion move up to a defensive position at Antoniushof - one platoon of infantry each covering the approach from Asselborn to the north and Clervaux to the east. Infantry was placed 300 yards in front of the three tank platoons of Co A 2nd Tk. The 73rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was ordered to displace their firing batteries to provide artillery support for both the Rose and Harper roadblocks from the near the village of Buret (located nortwest of the roadblocks).

08:30 18 December 1944 – The infantry of Task Force Rose fell back to the Co. “A” tanks, reporting that three enemy tanks supported by infantry were approaching.

09:00 18 December 1944 - Company “A” fires upon three approaching enemy tanks emerging from the woods just to the north of the Clervaux road. Hits were scored on all three tanks. One enemy tank was knocked out. The other two turned back to the woods. Next, four infantry supported enemy tanks came into view from the woods to the northeast. A few minutes later a full tank column was spotted coming from the north along the Asselborn highway. The tanks turned their machine guns upon the American armored infantry forcing them to retreat to behind the tanks. The approaching column from the north was fired upon and withdrew.

10:00 18 December 1944 – the M7 howitzers of the 73rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion assumed their new firing positions near Buret and assisted by engaging in indirect fire upon the enemy positions approaching the roadblock. Enemy artillery briefly shelled the TF Rose position and then proceeded to lay down smoke in front them. The smoke lifted in 15 minutes, but no immediate assault followed.  

11:00 18 December 1944 - enemy shelling began again and a smoke screen was laid in front of the positions of TF Rose. After 90 minutes, the smoke cleared and at least 16 tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division had closed to within 800 yards of the tanks of Company “A”. Additional fire was received from ground mount enemy 88s estimated to be 2500 yards distant to the east. In the exchange of fire, three enemy Mark IVs were knocked out, while one of their own was set ablaze, the gun of a second disabled, and a third which threw a track and was destroyed by its crew.

12:00 18 December 1944 (and subsequent times indeterminate) –

Co. “A” could now hear tanks on its right flank and shifted a platoon to cover that flank whereupon they engaged three more enemy tanks - one of which as destroyed and the other two withdrew into defilade.  One Sherman bogged and had to be evacuated. Once again, the riflemen of the 52^nd AIB were forced with withdraw behind the tanks again while being raked by enemy machine gun fire.

With the bulk of TF Rose facing east now, and only one tank platoon left to defend the north flank, the enemy moved units toward that position to initiate an attack. TF Rose was nearly surrounded and about to be destroyed.

Co. “A” commander Lt. De Roche was ordered to lead his tanks out of their encirclement to the west and then south and resume their attack upon the enemy astride the road to Bastogne. TF Rose soon occupied a new position near Wincrange and once more impeded enemy movement along the road to Bastogne. In yet another exchange of fire, two more enemy Mark IVs were set ablaze.

As darkness now approached (perhaps around 4PM on December 18th) the enemy initiated a heavy white phosphorous barrage, necessitating the tanks to stay buttoned up. Lt. De Roche then withdrew his tanks to behind a ridge south of Wincrange. During this time the tankers could hear enemy tanks to their right and rear, in addition to their front.

At last Lt. De Roche was given permission by Major Dalton to withdraw to the NE, toward Troine.

As can be seen in my correspondences with him, Lt. De Roche managed to extricate his tank company from complete annihilation. And if you are keeping count, it would appear that at least 7 enemy (presumably Mark IV) tanks were destroyed.

Meanwhile, down the road near Allerborn, Task Force Harper was overrun by the enemy. If it were not for Patton’s Combat Command “B” of the 10th Armored Division and Team Cherry coming from Bastogne to Longvilly, the road to Bastogne would have been clear for the 2nd Panzer Division tanks. As it was, Team Cherry and the remnants of CCR/9AD suffered horrendous losses between Longvilly and Magaret.

***

00:00 19 December 1944 – according to Lt. De Roche, as he headed on the road toward Troine, on his way to Houffalize, he ran into Lt. Colonel Harper and a few remnants of TF Harper (a platoon of assault guns). Upon reaching Troine, LTC Harper held back five of De Roche’s Sherman tanks to remain with him. With Harper’s action unknown to De Roche, De Roche and Co. “A” continued on to Houffalize where he came upon elements of the 82nd Airborne division. The officer in charge there told De Roche to head south on Hwy 26 to Bastogne for fuel and ammunition. Meanwhile, Harper and his detachment of tanks and assault guns were ambushed at Vissoule and were destroyed. Some survivors were captured and some escaped. Lt. Colonel Harper was killed in this action.

04:00 19 December 1944 – Lt. De Roche now had 9 tanks left, including Kelly’s tank in first platoon. After staying in Houffalize for nearly four hours, they set out to Bastogne for fuel and ammunition. When they reached a traffic checkpoint on Hwy 26, they were told instead to go to St. Hubert. At St. Hubert they were able to find fuel, but no ammunition.

***

20 December 1944 – Lt. De Roche and Co. “A” left St. Hubert and proceeded south to Neufchateau to acquire ammunition. Upon arrival, De Roche found that Captain Walter Meier from CCR was there looking to re-assemble stragglers. De Roche’s 9 M4 tanks were combined with five tanks from “C” company that escaped from TF Harper, along with 16 riflemen from 52nd AIB. Capt. Meier received permission to proceed from Neufchateau back to Bastogne.

23:00 20 December 1944 – Capt. Meier along with Lt. De Roche of Co. “A” 2^nd Tank Bn., Lt. Sawyer of the C/811th Tk. Destroyers, and Lt. Cartwright of C/9AD Engineers, 14 Sherman and their crew and 16 riflemen proceeded to Bastogne. Under the cover of fog, they proceeded safely to an assembly area at Villeroux. Later that night Captain Howard Pyle, the commanding officer of company “C” of 2nd Tank battalion, arrived at the assembly area with another 60 riflemen of the 52nd AIB. This new force was designated Team PYLE.

Just after daylight – 21 December 1944 – Team PYLE sustained an attack by a company of enemy infantry of the 26th Volksgrenadiers. With the assistance of the batteries of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Team PYLE were eventually able to throw back this attack. Two subsequent attacks occurred shortly thereafter. Patrols of tanks and infantry were sent out to reconnoiter along the railroad east and south of Villeroux, and they succeeded in locating strong forces of German infantry along the railroad track and inflicted heavy casualties among them before returning.

7:00 - 21 December 1944 – During one of these morning attacks after 7AM, Kelly’s tank commander Sgt. Bisterfeldt was looking through a pair of binoculars. He then passed the binoculars to Kelly, and Kelly was fatally shot by an enemy sniper.

------------------------

Background to "The Battle of The Bulge"

In December 1944 Adolph Hitler and his Nazi regime launched the deceptively named operation "Watch on the Rhine" - a large-scale Western Front counteroffensive in an attempt to drive a wedge between the American army in the south and the British and Canadian armies to the north. Their ultimate military aim was to cross the Meuse River, and capture the key seaport of Antwerp, Belgium (see the map below).  The political aim was to create strife in the already strained American-British alliance. Both aims were highly ambitious given the overall strategic situation.

The offensive began in the Ardennes Forest in Belgium at 5:30am on the 16th of December, 1944 - with massive German gun and rocket artillery bombardments followed with the typical German blitzkrieg approach of using rapidly moving armored units to attack and exploit the weakest points in the enemy lines and ultimately surround and isolate the enemy.  

The main armored attack (“spearhead"), whose ultimate goal was to reach Antwerp, was carried out by the 6th Panzer Army commanded by General Sepp Dietrich. To their south was the 5th Panzer Army commanded by General Hasso von Manteuffel - whose task it was to capture the key towns of St. Vith and Bastogne, while also protecting the 6th Panzer army’s flank. The German 7th and 15th Armies were to protect the 5th and 6th Panzer Army’s respective flanks. St. Vith and Bastogne were at crucial junctures of the road and rail network and vital strategic targets.

In all, the German attack was comprised of 30 divisions (and what amounted to 250,000 men) and was one of the largest battles fought in WWII. Casualties on the Allied side approached 80,000 men.

The German drive on, and the American defense of, Bastogne Belgium — December 16 - 17, 1944

Since the infantry company commander was Captain Rose and the tank company commander was First Lieutenant DeRoche, the ranking officer was put in charge, and the tank-infantry team became Task Force Rose with the mission described above.

Action of "C" Company, 2nd Tank Battalion, 17-18 December 1944: 

After the Battalion had moved from Trois Verges to a road junction approximately 1,000 yards east of Allerborn, the night of 17 December 1944, it was ordered that Company "C", 2nd Tank Battalion, plus "B" Company of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion would defend this road junction. These two companies were to form a team and the senior company commander would be the team commanding officer; therefore, Captain Hays of the infantry company was in command. Captain Pyle commanded "C" Company.

Due to the fact that the infantry was some miles away, "C' Company, 2nd Tank Battalion sent a platoon about 500 yards north on the north-south road and another deployed near the road junction to defend it until the infantry arrived. There was no enemy action at this point. The infantry company arrived at approximately 0230. At that time Captain Hays took command and hastily deployed his company, leaving the tanks in their same positions. There was no enemy action that night.

All during the next day the position was strengthened by constructing dug-in anti-tank guns, tanks moved to better firing positions, and the infantry dug in. The noise of the battle being fought by Company "A", 2nd Tank Battalion up ahead could be heard throughout the day. All in all, approximately fifty stragglers from the 28th Division were stopped by this team as they came back from the fighting ahead and were put in the line with the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion's Company.

These extra units were deployed, and at this time were told to hold the road junction at all costs and to the last man. Only an order by Corps would allow them to withdraw.

The enemy started his attack at about 2000 the evening of December 18th, moving an overwhelming force of tanks and infantry in from three directions under cover of a mortar and artillery barrage.

The battle was furious, and the position of Team Harper was overrun by 2330. The order was given to fight through the enemy lines back to Longvilly.

After the war, it was learned, from a review of German records, and from interviews with former German officers that Col. Lauchert's 2nd Panzer Division attacked the 2nd Tank Battalion's positions on the 18th of December 1944. New tanks in the 2nd Panzer came from the factories of Breslau and contained some of Hitler's new, wonder weapons, the infra-red night-fighting device. This piece of night sighting equipment was used for the very first time during the war at the Allerborn road junction.

————

Task Force Rose (Capt. L. K. Rose), at the northern roadblock, consisted of a company of Sherman tanks, one armored infantry company, and a platoon of armored engineers. The southern roadblock was manned by Task Force Harper (Lt. Col. Ralph S. Harper), which consisted of the 2d Tank Battalion (-) and two companies of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion.

In midmorning the troops peering out from the ridge where the northern roadblock had been set up saw figures in field gray entering a patch of woods to the east on the Clerf road, the first indication that the enemy had broken through the Clerf defenses. These Germans belonged to the Reconnaissance Battalion of Lauchert's 2d Panzer Division, whose infantry elements at the moment were eradicating the last American defenders in Clerf. Lauchert's two tank battalions, unaffected by the small arms fire sweeping the Clerf streets were close behind the armored cars and half-tracks of the advance guard.

Two attempts by the Reconnaissance Battalion to feel out Task Force Rose were beaten back with the help of a battery from the 73d Armored Field Artillery Battalion whose howitzers were close enough to give direct fire at both American roadblocks. About 1100 the first Mark IV's of the 2d Battalion, 3d Panzer Regiment, appeared and under cover of an effective smoke screen advanced to within 800 yards of the Shermans belonging to Company A, 2d Tank Battalion. The Germans dallied, probably waiting for the Panzer Battalion, which finally arrived in the early afternoon, then deployed on the left of the Mark IV's. Taken under direct fire by the enemy tank guns, the American infantry withdrew in the direction of the southern roadblock and Rose's tanks now were surrounded on three sides.

[This description of the 73^rd’s disposition is entirely incorrect according to official reports and the fact that the firing batteries of the 73^rd AFA assumed their positions at Buret by 10:00 and began registration for indirect fire missions in support of the Task Force Rose roadblock. Perhaps this is the result of comingling of the 73^rd’s direct fire engagements with the enemy on the subsequent evening.]

Colonel Gilbreth, whose combat command was directly attached to VIII Corps and who was charged with the defense of the entry to the Bastogne highway, could not commit his tiny reserve without the approval of the corps commander. A telephone message from Gilbreth to the VIII Corps command post, at 1405, shows the dilemma in all tactical decisions made during these hours when a few troops, tanks, and tank destroyers represented the only forces available to back up the splintering American line.

————

Action of Team Pyle, 20 to 25 December 1944: Team Pyle, commanded by Captain Howard J. Pyle, commander of Company "C", 2nd Tank Battalion was formed at Bastogne, Belgium on the evening of 20 December 1944. It consisted of 14 medium tanks from Company "A" and Company "C" of the 2nd Tank Battalion under command of 1st Lt. John E. De Roche, Commander of Company "A", 2nd Tank Battalion, and sixty infantrymen of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion under command of Lt. Adams. In addition, there was the command halftrack of Headquarters, 2nd Tank Battalion and its personnel.

This force arrived in Vellereux, Belgium at about 2300, 20 December 1944. Its mission was to attack and withdraw at certain places in the enemy lines to keep the enemy off balance. Definite orders were to be given the next day. Information of the enemy situation was not available at higher headquarters, but a strong defensive position was established for the night. Just after daylight 21 December 1944, Vellereux was attacked by approximately a company of German infantry. This attack was repulsed, and the enemy driven back with an estimated loss of 75 dead and 20 prisoners

During the morning two more attacks in similar strength were repulsed and the situation was considered to be well in hand. Patrols of tanks and infantry were sent out to reconnoiter along the railroad east and south of the town, and they succeeded in locating strong forces of German infantry along the railroad track and inflicted heavy casualties among them before returning.

At about 1100, Captain Pyle was ordered by the Combat Command Commander, who had arrived at that time, to send one-third of his force north along the road to Senonchamps, then west to stop an enemy column coming east from Sibret. Shortly after this, the remainder of the tanks were sent to follow on this mission.

At about 1200, Vellereux with the remainder of Team Pyle defending was subjected to a terrific artillery and mortar barrage which caused heavy casualties in the remainder of the command. The command half-track was lost in this action.

A platoon of tanks was immediately recalled, and they were employed to cover the withdrawal of the remaining forces from the town and to cover the withdrawal of two 155-mm howitzer battalions which were in position around the town. As orderly withdrawal was made, and the Task Force Pyle was ordered to go into a defensive position about 3,000 yards to the north to protect the position of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion of the 10th Armored Division. Occupation of this position was completed by night- fall.

This position was held from the night of 21 December to 24 December 1944. During this time, the enemy attacked from almost all sides. He subjected the area to an almost constant shelling by mortars and medium artillery. Tank crews were forced to stay in their tanks for as long as forty-eight hours at a stretch, urinating in their helmets, and wrapping up in anything available to keep warm during their long watches in vehicles which were lined with a half-inch of frost caused by the severe cold weather. Many had lost their extra clothing in the previous fighting, but what was left was divided with the infantry in their common fight for survival. Although the regular supply of rations had ceased to exist, the scanty reserve of "D" bars, carried in the vehicles was divided with the doughboys. Some machine guns from the tanks were dismounted and given to the infantrymen to build up fire power.

Major Watts, 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion arrived 22 December to take command and the force then became Task Force Watts.

1st Lt Robert J PETERSON of the 2nd Platoon, "B” Company, 27th Armored Infantry Bn, 9th Armored Division wrote this in “Battle of the Bulge Memories”:

The three combat commands of the 9th Armored Division were in widely separated locations when the Germans attacked on December 16, 1944. As a result, all three were engaged with different German forces and none were under their division control.

Combat Command “R” (C.C.R.), commanded by Colonel Joseph Gilbreth, of Columbus, Georgia, had the roughest assignment of the three commands and perhaps of any command in the Battle of the Bulge. Combat Command “R” stood fast and slugged it out against the overwhelming might of the German panzers smashing toward Bastogne. Had it not been for Combat Command “R”, the Nazis would have captured Bastogne before the arrival by truck of the 101st Airborne Division and arrival of Combat Command “B” of the 10th Armored Division.

The 9th Armored Division was on the SECRET list and, consequently, its actions were not being reported. The SECRET classification was not removed until January 5, 1945, after the action at Bastogne. Consequently, the 101st Airborne received the credit for the defense and the highly publicized “Nuts” reply by the acting 101st commander to the German demand for surrender.

Small CCR task forces from the 2nd Tank Battalion and the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion took up positions on the road leading to Bastogne from the east. Their missions were to block the road at all costs, and they did so with considerable loss of men and equipment. Many held their position even though wounded and when German tanks rolled around and through them and when the German infantry infiltrated their positions in the darkness.

There was no front line. Artillerymen, tankers and engineers fought as doughboys. The 2nd Tank Battalion encountered elements of nine German divisions. The 73rd Armored Field Artillery fought its way out of a trap and continued to keep its guns in action.

Three Battalion Commanders Killed. Casualties were heavy. All three of the battalion commanders were lost. CCR was credited with delaying the enemy for 36 to 48 hours east of Bastogne after which its surviving troops managed to fall back into Bastogne. These CCR troops were then employed as a mobile reserve force known as Team SNAFU.

Task Force SNAFU became a potent force in the ensuing defense battles. It was organized chiefly as a trouble shooter for the 101st Airborne, operating under a 10 minutes alert, speeding to defend area threatened by German attacks. Bolstered by Armor, SNAFU proved to be an asset in the 101st Airborne defense of Bastogne until it was relieved by an element of the Third Army.

CCR was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its action in defending Bastogne, the highest award a unit can receive for combat action.

Because of the secrecy order on the 9th Armored Division, and the wide separation of its three commands, and the fact the combats commands were not under their division control and faced different attacking German armies, the division did not receive the public attention it deserved. However, commendations came from two Army commander—General Courtney H Hodges and General George S. Patton, Jr. and also from three corps commanders and four divisions commanders.

It was not until 55 years later that the Cold War ended, and German records were obtained that the other two combat commands were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

Text on the plaque reads:

"U.S. 9TH ARMORED DIVISION 

COMMANDER: MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. LEONARD

IN DEFENSE OF:

LUXEMBOURG: OCT 20-DEC 26, 1944

BELGIUM: DEC 16, 1944-JAN 4, 1945

THE DIVISION'S THREE COMBAT COMMANDS FOUGHT THE ARDENNES BATTLE AS INDEPENDENT, WIDELY SEPARATED UNITS ATTACHED TO OTHER DIVISIONS AND CORPS ON THE 

NORTH, CENTER, AND SOUTH OF THE GERMAN ATTACK, AS SHOWN ON THE ADJACENT PLAQUES

HASTILY ORGANIZED FORCES COMPOSED OF COOKS, CLERKS, MECHANICS, AND OTHERS FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF DIVISIONAL UNITS DEFENDED THE BERG-MERSCH AREA FROM DEC 16 TO 23, AND THEN ESTABLISHED A COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE SCREEN EXTENDING 50 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST FROM NEUFCHATEAU, BELGIUM. 

THE DIVISION LATER WON FAME AS THE FIRST ALLIED FORCE TO CROSS THE RHINE BY ITS DARING SEIZURE OF THE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN ON MARCH 7, 1945. IT THEN CAPTURED LIMBURG, GIESSEN, WARBURG, ENCIRCLED LEIPZIG AND ENDED ITS COMBAT NEAR KARLSBAD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON MAY 8, 1945 

CAMPAIGNS: ARDENNES - RHINELAND - CENTRAL EUROPE

PRESENTED BY THE 9TH ARMORED DIVISION ASSOCIATION, CERCLE D'ETUDE SUR LA BATAILLE DES ARDENNES, AND THE CITIZENS OF MEDERNACH, IN MEMORY OF THOSE OF THE DIVISION WHO DIED IN BATTLE DURING WORLD WAR II.

DEDICATED: MARCH 3, 1985”

Text on the plaque to CCR reads:

"COMBAT COMMAND "R"

FROM DEC 16 TO 19, CC "R" DEFENDED ROADBLOCKS ON THE TROIS VIERGES-BASTOGNE HIGHWAY AGAINST GERMAN PANZER AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS. SURROUNDED AND DECIMATED NEAR LONGVILLY, ITS SURVIVORS REACHED BASTOGNE WHERE, AS THE NUCLEUS OF FAMED "TEAM SNAFU". THEY JOINED IN ITS DEFENSE UNTIL RELIEVED ON DEC 31.

BY DELAYING THE GERMAN ADVANCE DURING THE CRITICAL EARLY DAYS OF THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE, CC "R" GAINED THE TIME NEEDED FOR OTHER U.S. UNITS TO CONCENTRATE AT, AND HOLD, BASTOGNE, FOR WHICH IT WAS AWARDED THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY) AND THE BELGIAN CROIX DE GUERRE WITH PALM."

————————————

———————

Alex Fredrick Bisterfeldt, age 90, died Monday, Feb. 21, 2011, at the Hays Good Samaritan Center, Hays. He was born May 21, 1920, in rural Ellsworth County to Carl and Dorothea (Funk) Bisterfeldt. He married Theresa (Short) on Oct. 26, 1946, at Hays. She died Sept 9, 2000.

He was a veteran of the U.S. Army and served during WW II. He attended school North of Holyrood, and then joined the Army in 1939. Then he attended High School in Camp Polk in Leesville, La., in 1942. In the Army he served in the Second Tank Battalion, Ninth Armored Division, European Theatre of Operation, including the Battle of The Bulge. He also acted as an interpreter for captured German soldiers. He received the Bronze Star, The Presidential Unit Citation and the French Croix de Guerre.

He was a heavy-duty mechanic in Civil Service on a Military Base in Barstow, Calif., for about 35 years. He lived in Great Bend, Pratt and moved to Hays Good Samaritan Center in 2009. He was a member of the Church of Christ.

Late on Dec 17th, I was ordered to the junction of hwys 12 & 18 to block all enemy movement to the south. On the following morning when Captain Rose, who was supposed to have joined me, still had not shown, I was ordered to assume command. Phil Baird's "History of the Second Tank Battalion" has a rather inaccurate narration of the fighting on the 18th, but by evening I was backed up to the town of Lullange with the enemy to my front, my right and my rear. There was no enemy to my left, but I could occasionally hear distant firing from that side. After discussing my situation, Maj. Dalton asked me if he thought I could break out. I told him I could give it a go. He told me to go for it. 

I moved off to the left and eventually reached a road running generally to the northwest. I _nned up on that road and shortly afterward came upon a lone tank parked on the right side of the road. I stopped to see who it was. It was LTC Harper. I was puzzled as to why he was there alone when the battalion command section was south between Allerborn and Longvilly. I asked LTC Harper if he wanted to head the column. He told me to move on and he would fall in at the tail end of the column. 

Moving on I soon came to a town (Troine) and halted briefly to verify my location. I then resumed the movement, went to two subsequent towns (Buret and Tavigny) and finally reached Vissoule. As I reached the first buildings, I could just barely make out a roadblock in the dark consisting of farm carts. I told my driver to hit it hard and, as we broke through, we were hit with heavy but ineffective machine gun fire. I radioed to my company that the enemy had occupied the town and to spray both sides of the road with machine gun fire to keep the enemy pinned down. We cleared the town and a few kilometers further we reached Houffalize. 

A detachment from 82nd AB Div. was on its way up north and had stopped in the town on a break. I asked the OIC where I could pick up some supplies since my tanks were critically low on gas and also very low on ammunition. He thought we could get what we needed at Bastogne. 

I decided my men needed a bit of a break and at 4AM after a little more than 4 hours of rest we moved south on Hwy 26. Eventually we came to a traffic control point where I was informed that Bastogne had been captured (which it had not) but there was another supply point at St. Hubert. At St. Hubert I got my tanks fully gassed but there was no ammunition. I was told that Corps, which was at Neufchateau, could provide one with information as to where I could pick up ammunition. 

While my tank was being refueled, I walked down the line of tanks to see how everyone was doing. I was surprised to see five tanks were missing. Lt. Bob Linder, one of my officers who was in the last tank, said that LTC Harper had stopped them while the company was stopped in Troine and they were still there when the company moved on, when all the tanks were refueled we rolled on to Neufchateau where the ammunition was picked up. Because the road to Bastogne was covered by enemy fire, we waited until dark then moved up to Bastogne.

Lt. John Terral and Lt. Tom Wickey (an officer in my company) were with LTC Harper and his group. Lt. John Terral evaded capture, was evacuated when he was wounded in Bastogne, and returned to the company after the war. Lt. Wickey was captured and escaped, then found his way into Bastogne. He died three years ago.

Most of what I know about LTC Harper's death I got from Tom. According to Tom, LTC Harper led the tanks into Troine and gathered the vehicle commanders to decide what action should be taken. While the discussion was going on, an individual in an American uniform drove up. LTC Harper talked to him and, according to Tom, when he replied he didn't really have a German accent, but he didn't exactly sound like an American, and somebody said, "this bastard sounds like a kraut." With that, the would be American appeared to be reaching for a weapon and somebody shot him. LTC Harper then decided to move. They passed through two towns, and when they reached the third town, Vissoule, they ran into an ambush. I assume the enemy had been highly alerted as a result of our having shot up the place when we went through. All of the vehicles were lost, many of the men were shot, others evaded capture, and the rest, Tom concluded, were captured. Tom later escaped and found his way into Bastogne. Tom said it was total confusion. No one took control and it was every man for himself, and with everyone primarily concerned about not getting shot, there was no way anyone could have seen how LTC Harper got shot. Tom's opinion was that to say LTC Harper was killed by machine gun fire is an educated deduction.

This letter forwarded to me by Mr. Morris is particularly interesting as it is written by Company “A”, First Platoon commander John Terral. In this letter Mr. Terral is responding to Mr. Morris’ query in 2001 about Team Pyle. One of the more interesting items is his letter is the handwritten mention that the 14 tanks of Company “A” that survived to be used in Team Pyle action were M4A3E8s (HVSS). I find that hard to believe, but Mr. Terral would not likely be mistaken, and goes out of his way to mention it to Mr. Morris.

Cole, Dr. Hugh. “The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge”. 1964

Dunnigan, James F. “Wacht am Rhein”. 1977

Dupuy, Trevor N., et al. “Hitler’s Last Gamble”. 1994

MacDonald, Charles. "A Time for Trumpets”. 1985

Reichelt, Dr. Walter. "Phantom Nine”. 1987

Stansell, Patrick and Laughlin, Kurt. “Son of Sherman Volume 1”. 2013